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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-------------------------------------------------

STATE OF UTAH,
-vs-

)
Plaintiff-Respondent, )

GERALD FAY TUGGLE,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)

Case No.
I 2695

------------------------------------------------BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Gerald Fay Tuggle appeals from judgment and
conviction entered against him in a jury trial before the District Court of the Second Judicial
District, in and for Weber County, the Honorable
John F. Wahlquist, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appel ]ant was found guilty of transferring
stolen property, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, in and for the County of
Weber, State of Utah, and was sentenced according
to law to imprisonment in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appel Jant seeks a reversal of the conviction and judgment thereon and an order directing
the case be dismissed or, in the alternative, a
new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appel ]ant is presently incarcerated in the
Utah State Prison after being convicted by a jury.
The information charged the appellant as follows:
11
with intent to procure or
pass title to a 1969 Dodge Dart,
Serial No. LP2309B1A3222, which he

2

knew or had reason to believe had
been stolen or unlawfully taken,
transfer possession of the same to
Cu t rub u s Motor Company . . . 1 1
The appellant on or about the 21st day of
September, 1970, procured a loan from Peoples
Finance Company in the amount of $892.40 and purportedly used as security a 1969 Dodge Dart automobile. The State's evidence indicated that the
Dodge Dart was in fact a stolen car that was sold
to the appellant with lifted serial numbers taken
from a wrecked car in a Salt Lake wrecking yard.
The Peoples Finance Company took possession
of the Dodge on about the 28th day of October, 1970,
claiming the same to have been abandoned. On the
13th day of December, 1970, an employee of Peoples
delivered the Dodge to Cutrubus Motors and made
arrangements with Mr. Cutrubus to trade the Dodge
for a 1962 Ford Pickup. (T.79). On the 16th day
of December the appel I ant executed an agreement
with Cutrubus to purchase a 1962 Ford Pickup and to
use a Dodge automobile as a trade-in. The appellant's contract with Peoples was paid off, and a
balance of $275.00 was remaining on the new contract with Cutrubus.
The Dodge was picked up by the authorities
from the used car lot at Cutrubus Motors.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE INFORMATION AGAINST THE APPELLANT SINCE THE STATE AS A
MATTER OF LAW DID NOT MEET THE BURDEN OF PROOF
CONCERNING THE TRANSFERRING OF POSSESSION BY THE
DEFENDANT TO CUTRUBUS AS ALLEDGED IN THE INFORMATION.

3
The appellant was prosecuted in the case under
the provisions contained in §41-1-112 Utah Code
Annotated. The specific charge is that the appellant transferred possession of the 1969 Dodge Dart
to Cutrubus with the knowledge that the same had
been stolen.
It is the appellant's contention that there
is no evidence in the record that the appellant or
anyone authorized by the appellant transferred the
Dodge Dart to Cutrubus Motor Company. The record
is clear that the Dodge Dart was taken into custody
by an emp I oyee from Peop I es Finance Company. (T. 198).
It was Mr. Moyer from Peoples Finance Company who
transferred the physical possession of the automobile to Cutrubus, and not the appellant. (T. 78).
At the time the transfer of possession was
made to Cutrubus, the appellant had no possessory
rights to the car since the finance company had
considered the car abandoned on the 28th day of
October, 1970, and a default on the Joan on the
9th day of November, 1970. (T. 198, 199).
Most authorities hold that the State must prove
each essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and such elements cannot be presumed or
left to conjecture. 23 CJS §918 P.637 Criminal Law.
A line of Utah Supreme Court decisions have consistently held that a criminal case requires proof of
each element of the crime by evidence beyond all
reasonable doubt of the existence of each such
element. State v. Hendricks, 258 P2d 452, 123 Utah
267 (1953); State v. Clark, 223 P2d 184, 118 Utah
517 (1950); State v. Whitley, 110 P2d 337, JOO Utah
14 (1941); State v. Adamson, 125 P2d 429, IOI Utah
534 (1942); State v. Gutheil, 98 P2d 943, 98 Utah
205 (1940); State v. Renzo, 443 P2d 392, 21 Utah Ed.
205 (1968).
In the Adamson case the court stated that the

4
trial court erred in not granting the appel ]ant's
motion to dismiss at the end of the State's case
as wel I as the appel lant 1 s motion for a directed
verdict at the conclusion of al 1 the evidence.
Since the transferring of possession in the
instant case is an essential element of the crime
.1t .1s our contention that the Trial Court should '
have granted appel lant 1 s motion to dismiss and
motion for a directed verdict. (T. 193) (T. 204).
PO I NT 11
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE CONDUCTION OF THE
TRIAL BY ITS EXAMINATION OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES
AND ASSISTING THE STATE'S ATTORNEY IN PRESENTING
HIS CASE TO THE JURY.
On nearly every page of the transcript the
trial court was either examining the State's witnesses or suggesting to the State 1 s attorney what
he may ask of the witness. At one point the trial
court announced to the jury that this was the
first jury trial handled by the State 1 s attorney.
(T.5). The appellant believes that this conduct
by the trial judge had a significant bearing on the
outcome of the trial which was grossly unfair to
the appel !ant. The appel Jant further contends that '
the trial judge conducted the trial in such a manner that the jury could reasonably conclude that
the court had taken on the role of an advocate
rather than an impartial judge.
It is recognized that the trial court has a
good deal of discretion in asking the witnesses
questions where the purpose is to determine the
true facts. Authorities also recognize that it is
not the function of the court to caution or advise
the prosecuting attorney in order to supply some
deficiency in proof of testimony favorable to the
State. U.S. v. Carengella, 198 F2d 3, 97 L.Ed. 682

5
(1952).

The transcript wil 1 show that the court
supplied the prosecuting attorney with
questions to ask a witness, or asked the question
himself in order to supply a deficiency in the
proof favorable to the State. (T. 73, 61, 21, 43,
45, 46, 56, 59, 61, 70, 76, 83, 98, 122).
At one point in the trial the court excused
the jury and examined the State's witness for a
considerable length of time in order to advise the
prosecuting attorney what he could do with the
various documents that the State 1 s witness had at
the trial. (T. 46-55).
The case of Rice v. State, 225 P2d 186 (1950)
stated that a continuous and repeated interrogation
of witnesses by the trial judge, which tends to
indicate his opinion as to the guilt or innocence
of the defendant, may constitute reversible error.
PO I NT I 11
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN RECEIVING ITEMS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE STATE TO PROVE A
CHAIN OF TITLE TO THE APPELLANT.
During the course of the trial several documents to prove the chain of title were offered by
the State and received into evidence. It is the
appel ]ant's contention that some of these documents
were improperly admitted, in that they did not meet
the requirements outlined in the Rules of Evidence
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court effective July 1,
1971.
The State's Exhibit J, which purports to be
an original application for title was improperly
admitted as it did not meet the requirements as
explained in Rule 72 and Rule 68. The
witness, Mr. Berry, who provided the foundation for

6

the exhibit, testified that he was the custodian
of the records at the Utah State Tax Commission
Mr. Berry further testified that he reproduced .
Exhibit J from a microfilm viewer and print that
is kept on record in the Motor Vehicle Department.
(T. 55-57). The court ruled that Exhibit J was
admissible under Rule 72, which we think is error.
Rule 72 permits an admissible writing to be proven
by:
Photostatic, microfilm, microcard,
miniature photograph, or other process
which accurately reproduces or forms
a durable medium for so reproducing
the original or enlargement thereof
11

11

It is the appellant's position that the above
rule would permit an original document to be reproduced in the manner described in Rule 72 if properly
authenticated and then attested by the person making
the reproduction that it was in the regular course
of such business or official activity to make such
copies and reproductions. We do not be! ieve that
Rule 72 or any other rule would permit a nonlegible
photostat of a microfilm to be admissible as documentary evidence.
Mr. John R. McKnight, a witness for the State,
testified that he was employed by the Motor Vehicle
Business Administration as an investigator.
Mr. McKnight further testified that he had nothing
to do with the custodial duties of the documents
which he identified.
(T. 98-101). Exhibits A, B,
C D E F G and I were offered and received into
' ' ' pursuant
' '
evidence
to the foundation testimony of
Mr. McKnight.
(T.
100 - 114). It is the appellant's contention that Mr. McKnight did not provide
the necessary foundation to admit these exhibits.
The foundation provided was nothing more than
testimony to the effect that Mr. McKnight examined
the documents while on file with the State Tax
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Commission. (T. 100). Mr. McKnight never removed the documents from the file to preserve
them for evidence, and he was not the custodian
that kept them in the regular course of business.
It is our position that these documents are not
self-executing but would require authentication
and attesting as provided for in the Rules of
Evidence. Rule 66A, Rule 68, Rule 70, Rule 72.
The trial court appeared to rule that the
reception of the documents was a jury question
\<1hen it stated:
I receive them in evidence. If
the jury believes that the exhibits here referred to by the witness were in fact part of the
original files of the State of
Utah, filed in the ordinary course
of business, then they may give it
whatever weight to them they think
they are entitled. If you do not
believe that evidence, then you
should exclude them from your
consideration.
The erroneous 3dmission of this evidence was
timely objected to, and it should have been excluded on the grounds stated by the defense.
CONCLUSION
A combination of the points raised by the
appel ]ant clearly reveals that he was not extended
a fair and impartial trial as provided for by law.
Respectful Jy submitted,
LYNN R. BROWN - Attorney
for Appe 11 ant
231 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah

